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COMMENT
Putting Polluters in Jail: The Imposition
of Criminal Sanctions on Corporate Defendants
Under Environmental Statutes
The condition of America's natural environment had been largely ignored by the nation until recently.' In the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-2
turies, the colonists viewed the land and its resources as unlimited.
Nature's abundance misled early Americans into believing that careless
use of the land or lumber was not detrimental. Even as the homesteaders
and ranchers of the 1800's extended the frontier westward, conservation
commanded little attention.' The early industrialists continued to exploit
the land and often made their fortunes at the expense of the natural environment. Throughout this country's history, our citizens' concerns about
preserving the environment for future generations were simply secondary
to the needs of the moment. The environment provided a vast wealth of
raw materials and resources for development, but at the same time, it
became an all-purpose dumping ground for the waste generated by an evergrowing population.4 The air, land, and water became society's junkyard.
Although today government stands as a watchful overseer, regulating
everything from radiation' to herbicides, 6 it has not always been so.7 Only
in the past several decades have people begun to realize that pollution
1. But see G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW,
129-31 (1981) (in the late 19th century, John Muir was one of the few individuals who devoted
his life exclusively to preservation of the natural environment).

2. F.

SKILLERN, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

§§ 1.01-1.02 (1981).

3. See supra note 1.
4. But, of course, society's demands continue to increase for the products that are
often responsible for pollution. For example, the demand for vinyl chloride rose astronomically
over the last three decades. Vinyl chloride is a gas used in the production of plastics for
industrial and consumer use. In 1950 approximately 112 million pounds of vinyl chloride
were produced; by 1978 the level of production had risen to seven billion pounds. Vinyl chloride
has been implicated in damage to the liver, circulatory system, and bones. It has also been
held responsible for birth anomalies and cancers of the liver, brain, and respiratory and lymphatic systems.
The extractive industry, which produces the greatest amount of wastes, includes that
which is taken from mines, forests, and croplands. About 2.5 billion tons of solid waste are
generated each year in the form of mine tailings and spoils, forest residuals, and crop wastes.
Manufacturing disposes of the second largest quantity of wastes. In 1977, manufacturers
discarded an estimated 160 million tons of solid wastes such as sludges, slags, dust, paper
materials, and other organic and inorganic materials. These figures do not reflect consumer
wastes which accounted for an additional 150 million tons in 1978 (the equivalent of approximately 3.7 pounds per person per day). COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL TRENDS,

76-86, 90, 100 (1981).

5. 42 U.S.C. § 5801-5879 (1982).
6. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136a-136y (1982).
7. But see 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1982) (originally enacted as Rivers and Harbors Act of
1899, ch. 425, § 13, 30 stat. 1152). This Act was probably the most important of the early
federal pollution control laws for the protection of navigable waters. It prohibited the discharge
or deposit of any type or amount of refuse matter, except that which flowed from streets
and sewers, into navigable waters of the United States. 3 CLARK, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS
§ 244.1 (1967). The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 was described as a consolidation of prior
acts which had listed specific pollutants, such as sawdust and cinders, and forbade their
release into specific bodies of water, such as the New York Harbor. United States v. Standard Oil, 384 U.S. 224, 226-28 (1966). For the most part polluters have had little to fear until
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must be stopped. This public awareness elevated environmentalism to the
status of a cause c6lbbre during the 1960's and 1970's.1 As with other
movements, public activism stimulated Congress to establish the current
pervasive system of government controls.
In attempting to punish those who jeopardize the public's health and
well-being by polluting, Congress has seen fit to include criminal sanctions in several of today's environmental statutes.9 These criminal sanctions which exist as an alternative to civil penalties, injunctions, or administrative remedies, 10 will be the focus of this comment. After exploring how criminal sanctions are actually employed by the courts against
corporate defendants, I will argue that, as presently used, the sanctions
are ineffective deterrents. Finally, I will evaluate special problems which
exist for the prosecutor or judge who attempts to invoke criminal sanctions against a corporate defendant. Questions to be explored include the
feasibility and propriety of punishing the corporate entity, and difficulties
associated with proceeding against a corporate official or responsible individual within the corporate organization.
CRIMINAL SANCTIONS AGAINST CORPORATE POLLUTERS: THE PROBLEM
1
Only recently did Americans begin to consider pollution a crime.'
Polluting fresh water, destroying arable lands, and injecting lethal toxins into the earth are now recognized as morally reprehensible acts. These
acts involve more than just a failure to comply with an administrative
regulation, and more than just an economic wrong. Environmental pollution threatens society's welfare as much as acts traditionally labelled as
violent crimes."

recent years. The recent growth of federal regulatory agencies is apparent when one exannes
the Code of Federal Regulations. In 1949, the Code of Federal Regulations contained 22,055

pages but by 1980 it had grown to 102,195 pages. B. SCHWARTZ,

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,

267-68

(1982).
8. M. Ways, The Environment, A NationalMission for the Seventies, in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 1 (L. Jaffe & L. Tribe, eds. 1971).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 50-61.
10. United States v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1181 (D. Ariz. 1975). The court
held that under the FWPCA an administrator was not forced to first bring about compliance
with civil measures. A criminal action could be instituted from the outset.
11. The violent effects of industrial pollution were probably most graphically illustrated
by the Love Canal disaster which received much public attention in the late 1970's. For many
years Hooker Chemical buried thousands of drums containing industrial solvents under land
surrounding its New York facility. Hooker later sold parcels of this land for residential development and also graciously conveyed another section to the Niagara Falls Board of Education
for one dollar so a school could be erected. Reports of stillborn children, deafness, birth defects,
retardations, skin lesions, dizziness, and deterioration of bone marrow filled the media as
causal links between the chemicals and these physical ailments became apparent. The outraged
citizens of Niagara Falls finally succeeded in having the State of New York purchase their

contaminated homes. BROWN, LAYING WASTE 3-38 (1979).
12. R. Kramer, CorporateCriminality in CORPORATIONS AS

CRIMINALS

20 (E. Hochstedler

ed. 1984). Air pollution has been estimated to be responsible for 140,000 deaths annually.
The toxic wastes found at Love Canal, New York, Times Beach, Missouri, and Toone, Tennessee, proved to be so life-threatening that residents were evacuated permanently from their
contaminated homes. Clean-up workers could not risk even temporary exposure to the wasteridden soil. They had to wear protective suits, covering them from head to toe, before they
could handle these hazardous toxins. Deaths from chemical poisons, pose as great a danger
to society as a gun-toting killer.
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Although pollution comes from many sources, industry contributes
the most pollutants to the environment. 3 Corporations that have been
responsible for releasing toxic chemicals have proved to be difficult to
regulate. This was often due to the existence of the corporate veil, which
provided company officials with a shield from liability, although their actions and policies violated federal or state law. Thus, although the enactment of environmental legislation aimed at imposing criminal penalties
on corporate entities and their officials might be seen as a solution to this
problem, it has not proven to be so. The judiciary's reluctance to impose
criminal penalties on corporations has rendered the sanctions of little
value. 4
The continued unwillingness on the part of courts to punish the corporation or the responsible corporate officials stems from early views on
the subject. These current judicial attitudes can be explained by examining how reglatory violations were seen by the courts and the public
throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. First, these regulatory
violations were viewed as economic crimes; 5 for instance, compliance with6
health and safety codes was viewed as merely a matter of economics.1
Compliance was more costly than noncompliance, because corrective
devices were expensive and fines were slight.17 Therefore, it behooved the
profit-seeking company to break the law. Viewed as economic crimes, with
such an amorphous group as "the public" as its victim, judges often had
difficulty looking at the crimes as deserving of criminal punishment.' 8
"Criminal judges ... who are used to following the traditional requirement of mens rea, often hesitate to inflict heavy criminal penalties upon
one who may have unknowingly become a criminal."19 Often the violations
were not, and could not be, knowing2 0 or negligent, so imputing criminal
intent to a violator was disfavored.
The second view as to why courts are reluctant to punish corporations
involved criminal intent but also concerned the public's perceptions of
these prohibited acts. Originally, many regulatory crimes were crimes of
strict liability:' if the act was done, liability was imposed regardless of
intent." Regulatory crimes were strict liability crimes because regulatory
violations were not perceived as morally delinquent acts by the public.
For instance, in the early part of this century, health and housing code
violations were not viewed as morally reprehensible; people did not view
a landlord's failure to repair a broken window as damaging to the welfare
13. See supra note 4.
14. See infra notes 71-79 and accompanying text.
15. F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 2-561 to 2-562 (1983).
16. Id.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 73-79.
18. Comment, The Criminal Responsibilityof Corporate Officials for Pollution of the
Environment, 37 ALB. L.R. 61, 69 (1972).
19. Id
20. F. GRAD, supra note 15, at 2-560.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 2-561.
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of the society. Because the violations were not considered to be criminal
acts they were not punished as criminal acts."
Trying to explain the courts' "hands off" attitude toward punishing
corporations can best be understood by examining the development of
criminal penalties in analagous areas. Most environmental statutes are
recent additions to federal, state, and local law. In the corresponding area
of health and safety (which in the latter part of the nineteenth century
and much of the twentieth century included the anti-pollution codes),
sentences for business offenders were notoriously light.2" Despite the
availability of substantial fines, the average fine in New York City for
a housing code violation was fifty cents." Even as recently as 1970,
penalties were slight. In United States v. Park,26 the president of a large
supermarket chain was found guilty under the federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act" of exposing food to rodent contamination. 28 The president
was fined only $250,2 despite a guilty verdict on five separate counts.
The $250 fine amounted to less than a "slap on the wrist" for his supermarket chain, Acme, which was comprised of 874 retail outlets and 36,000
employees30
Another example of the traditional leniency to which corporate offenders have grown accustomed can be taken from the antitrust area. In
a single electrical equipment price fixing case in 1960, ' twenty-nine corporate defendants and forty-five individuals were prosecuted by the government. The General Electric Company (GE), the industry leader, was assessed the largest fine, $437,500.32 The fine seems to be substantial until
one realizes that not only was the penalty seen as surprisingly harsh,'3 but
that GE had annual sales amounting to four billion dollars in 1957. 4 Thirtyone of the forty-five individual defendants drew jail sentences, but twentyfour of these sentences were suspended.35 Of the seven defendants who6
actually served time in jail, thirty days was the maximum time served.1
With this background, it is not difficult to understand why environmental crimes, a new class of regulatory crimes, are often perceived
23. Id at 2-555, 2-564.
24. Comment, supra note 18, at 61-63 (1972).
25. Id
26. 421 U.S. 658, 670 (1974).
27. 21 U.S.C. § 3311k) (1974).
28. The inspectors found extensive evidence of rat and mouse infestation. Rodent pellets
were found along the walls of the warehouse and on the ledge in the hanging meat room.
In addition, rats had chewed holes in bales of various food products. These conditions had
been found to exist for an extended period of time. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658,
661-62 nn. 4-6.
29. Id at 666.
30. Id at 660.
31. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1960 Trade Cas. (CCH) 76753 (E.D.
Pa. March 24, 1960).
32. Comment, Is CorporateCriminalLiabilityReallyNecessary? 29 Sw. L.J. 908,921-22

(1975).
33.
34.
35.
36.

Watkins, ElectricalEquipment Antitrust Cases, 29 U. Cm. L. REv. 97, 100 n.7.
Id at 101.
Id at 100.
ld
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by the judiciary as inappropriate for criminal penalties." The idea that
environmental crimes should be punished by civil remedies is still
prevalent 8 Reliance on these explanations though, does not serve as adequate justification for the "foot-dragging" of today's judges.
Lack of criminal prosecution in the environmental area reflects a
hesitancy on the part of the prosecutors to seek such convictions, and
a reluctance on the part of the judiciary to impose such sanctions. This
presents a vicious circle, for if judges will not impose the penalties in a
meaningful way, then it is futile for prosecutors to seek such ineffective
sanctions. Moreover, the less often criminal penalties are sought, the less
chance judges have to impose them.
Even if one assumes a generous lag time after the enactment of the
legislation with criminal sanctions, so enforcement mechanisms can be
put in place, 9 the usage of criminal penalties by the courts has been slow.
For instance, once the Environmental Protection Agency came into existence, teams of investigators devoted to enforcing environmental legislation were available to seek out and collect evidence on violations. But these
field officers needed to be educated in proper criminal procedures if
criminal penalties were to be sought. Training was needed so searches and
seizures would not run afoul of the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule.
Even after these enforcement mechanisms were established prosecutions
were rare. Only a handful of cases exist in which criminal sanctions have
actually been imposed. Thus, deterrence provided by the existence of such
sanctions is, at present, minimal if not meaningless.
If federal and state governments are to deter environmental pollution,
courts and prosecutors must not be afraid to impose criminal sanctions.
Congress has provided for large fines 40 to aid in effective enforcement and
deterrence. 4' Congress has also added language to statutes calling for the
imposition of sanctions on "responsible corporate officials."4 2 The congressional mandate is thus clear; Congress has intended for those who pollute,
whether an individual or a corporation, to be punished by sanctions commensurate with the seriousness of the offense.
The social stigma which attaches to a criminal proceeding and to imprisonment will be an effective deterrent only if courts use criminal
penalties. 3 Businessmen and corporations are clearly concerned with their
reputations in the community. 44 Heavy fines, incarceration, and the subse37. Comment, supra note 18, at 67.
38. See United States v. Frezzo Bros., Inc., 602 F.2d 1123, 1124 n.1 (3d Cir. 1979).
39. Conversations with Judd Starr, Attorney, Land and Natural Resources Div., U.S.
Dep't. of Justice (August 1984).
40. See supra text accompanying notes 51-60.
41. Frezzo Bros., 601 F.2d at 1127 n.5.
42. See infra note 61 and accompanying text. Even though the legislative history is
unenlightening, the language on its face is clear. Congress did not intend for responsible
individuals to be able to escape from liability by hiding behind a corporate shield.
43. Comment, supra note 18, at 63.
44. Id
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quent loss of reputation, encourage corporate obedience. These penalties
carry no clout however, if they are not used as intended.
Fortunately, several factors have changed since the early days of
regulatory crime. First, environmental crimes are no longer viewed as
merely economic crimes. In 1970 a Harris poll indicated that most
Americans considered pollution to be the most serious problem facing their
communities. 45 Many
forms of pollution cause serious health problems,
4 6
sometimes death.
Society's changed perceptions have resulted in new demands on the
Congress for appropriate legislation. In response, lawmakers have produced environmental regulations which provide for punishments that have
heretofore been reserved for those criminals whose acts were considered
harmful and against society's collective mores. Now people have come to
realize that polluting is more than mere negligence; it is a deliberate act
with life-threatening consequences. The intent of the polluter is clearly
present when a violation is committed.
The perception of polluting as a violent crime helps to blur, or perhaps
eliminate, the malum in see - malum prohibitadistinction.4 1 Malum in see
crimes indicate a deliberateness on the part of the actor. Corporate officials of today are well educated on the effects and dangers of their products. When corporate policies are made that allow violations to occur, it
is not inadvertant. These decisions are informed and conscious. When
responsible corporate officials pollute, it is intentional, and the harmful
consequences are well documented. Violators know what will happen when
they discharge prohibited substances, and they should be held
accountable.
Second, under federal statutes criminal punishment is possible only
after intent or knowledge has been shown.48 When an employee commits
a violation while acting under orders, principles of fairness should allow
the court to impute the employee's knowledge to his manager, or to his
corporation. Obviously, a plant manager knows, or should know, what occurs in the facility of which he is in charge.49 In today's climate of extensive industrial regulation, it is naive to think that every corporate official
is unaware that his plant is violating an emissions standard or is burying
toxic waste in an improper storage or disposal facility. Managers are concerned with these matters, so if they violate the law the courts must be
45. Comment, supra note 18, at 68.
46. S. EPSTEIN, L. BROWN & C. POPE, HAZARDOUS WASTE IN AMERICA 36 (1982).
47. Comment, supra note 18, at 67. Generally, no criminal intent or mens rea is required
for malum prohibitacrimes and the mere accomplishment of the act or an omission is sufficient for criminal liability. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 861, 862 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
48. See F. GRAD, supra note 15, at 2-559 to 2-561 (suggesting that state and municipal
laws that do not require the showing of intent or knowledge can never deal effectively with
the environmental criminal).
49. In testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution, one union
official suggested that his company would turn back their furnaces when an air pollution
inspection was upcoming. Hearings before the Sub-Committee on Air and Water Pollution
of the Senate Committee Public Works, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 161 (1969).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol20/iss1/4

6

Kuruc: Putting Polluters in Jail: The Imposition of Criminal Sanctions o
1985

COMMENT

cognizant that these violators are knowing violators. Now that sanctions
which are capable of deterring polluters have been placed in environmental statutes, the final hurdle which must be overcome is the reluctance
of the judiciary to use these criminal penalties.

STATUTORY CRIMINAL SANCTIONS

Using a criminal penalty to enforce pollution regulations is neither
a recent development, nor unique to American jurisprudence. In the fourteenth century, for example, an Englishman was executed for violating
a Royal Proclamation on smoke abatement. 0 Today several environmental statutes, regulating various pollutants of land, air, and water contain
criminal penalties. Although sanctions no longer provide for capital
punishment, they do typically provide for the imposition of potentially
large criminal fines 5' and/or imprisonment of up to one year for an initial
conviction.
Under the Clean Air Act, 2 for example, noncompliance "[sjhall be
punished by a fine of not more than $25,000 per day of violation, or by
imprisonment for not more than one year, or by both." 3 Both the Toxic
Substances Control Act '4 and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(FWPCA)15 contain provisions identical to those found in the Clean Air
Act. These criminal sanctions can be applied to various violations: violations of permit limitations or conditions under the FWPCA;"6 violations
of emissions standards under the Clean Air Act; 57 and violations of the
Toxic Substances Control Act. Under the Toxic Substances Control Act
polluters can be subjected to sanctions for several reasons: for refusing
to permit inspections, for refusing to establish, maintain, and permit access to records, and for using various prohibited chemicals. 5 The FWPCA
and the Clean Air Act also provide criminal penalties for such actions as:
making false statements in reports that are required to be filed, falsifying required documents, and tampering with monitoring devices or
50. Mix, The MisdemeanorApproach to PollutionControl 10 ARiz. L. REV. 90 (1968),
citing Chass and Feldman, Tears for John Doe, 27 S. CAL. L. REV. 349-52 (1954).
51. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 38, n.39 (1972). The test for distinguishing
between criminal fines and civil fines is not a clear one. For example, if recovery is by indictment or information, it is criminal; otherwise it is civil. If the government sues it is criminal;
if a private person sues it is civil. If the fine is awarded to the government it is criminal,
if to a private party it is civil.
52. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626 (1982).
53. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7413(c)(1) (1982). The Endangered Species Act also provides criminal
penalties, but it is generally not used against corporate defendants. Therefore, it will not
be discussed in this comment.
54. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982).
55. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1328 (1982). The FWPCA has a unique feature in its scheme of
criminal fines. In the statute, Congress has set a minimum monetary fine. Although the
legislative history does not indicate why Congress chose to require a fine of at least $2,500
per day for violators, it seems Congress wanted to ensure that these fines served as
punishment.
56. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) (1982).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(1) (1982).

58. 15 U.S.C. § 2615 (1982).
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a maximum
methods.5 9 Criminal fines under these provisions are set at
60
of $10,000, with jail sentences not to exceed six months.
The criminal sanctions in these statutes apply to "any person. " 61The
definition of "person" encompasses many entities, including individuals
and corporations. Beyond this, however, Congress enlarged the term "person" to include "any responsible corporate officer."" By broadening the
class of potentially liable parties in this way, Congress demonstrated that
it did not intend for individuals in a corporate enterprise to escape punishment by hiding behind the corporate veil. With the addition of a provision specifically directed at corporate officers, Congress anticipated the
difficulties to be encountered when the government attempts to hold a
corporation, or those connected to it, criminally responsible for its acts
of pollution.
In addition, all of the statutes require that knowledge or willfulness
be shown before a criminal sanction can be imposed on a violator.63 In
a corporate context, the knowledge or willfulness requirement presents
difficulties. A corporation cannot act or think except through its agents;
yet the corporation itself must be held to have knowledge before it can
be punished. If the knowledge or willfulness of an individual actor could
not be imputed to a corporation, companies would be able to assert lack
of knowledge as a complete defense. To overcome this inequity, a legal
fiction which imputes to a corporation knowledge of the acts of their agents
has been employed by the courts."4 This fiction has been used since the
beginning of the twentieth century. In United States v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Co., the court characterized the refusal to impute knowledge to
a corporation as "but a remnant of an always fanciful and soon to be abandoned fiction. It seems to me as easy and logical to ascribe to a corporation an evil mind as it is to impute to it a sense of contractual obligation.'"65
The Wyoming Environmental Quality Act,"6 (WEQA) follows the
scheme of liability found in the federal statutes. A violation of the state
act carries a penalty of no more than $25,000 per day, or no more than
a year of imprisonment, or both. A $50,000 fine, or two years in jail, or
both, can be imposed on a repeat offender. A person who tampers with
monitoring devices or who falsifies records faces a $10,000 fine or a jail
59. Compare Federal Water Pollution Control Act, § 309, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) (1982)
with Clean Air Act, § 114(c)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(2) (1982).
60. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) (1982).
61. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(5) (1982) defines a person as "an individual, corporation, partnership, association, State, municipality, commission, or political subdivision of a State, or an
interstate body." Although the Toxic Substances Control Act applies to any person, the
term "person" is not specifically defined.
62. Compare Federal Water Pollution Control Act, § 309, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3) (1982)
with Clean Air Act, § 302(e), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(3) (1982). Both statutes provide: "Iflor purposes of this subsection [referring to the subsection on criminal penalties], the term 'person'
[means] ...

any responsible corporate officer."

63. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) (1982); 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(1) (1982); 15 U.S.C. § 2615(b) (1982).
64. United States v. MacAndrews and Forbes Co., 149 F. 823 (S.D.N.Y. 1906).
65. 149 F. 823, 835-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1906).
66. WYo. STAT. § 35-11-901 (Supp. 1984).
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sentence of one year. 67 The Wyoming legislature has added a further
criminal sanction that is to be applied against those who resist or impede
the enforcement activities of an agent regulating surface coal mining
operators.6" A maximum fine of $5,000 or one year in jail or both, can be
imposed. As with the federal statutes, all of the sanctions provided by
WEQA require a knowing or willful violation.6 9
APPLYING CRIMINAL SANCTIONS

The broad purpose of criminal penalties is now represented by a single
theory, deterrence. 7' The protection of society by making people do what
society regards as desirable, and by preventing them from doing what
society considers undesirable, is the ultimate goal of deterrence. 7 Criminal
penalties serve to control the behavior of the individual in several ways.
First, they specifically deter repeat offenders. Second, they generally deter
potential offenders who see others being punished. The social stigma
associated with criminal sanctions is one aspect of punishment which can
serve as both a specific and general deterrent. In cases involving well-off2
defendants, the threat of social stigma may be particularly effective.1
Criminal sanctions can only serve to deter individuals and corporations if they are actually used by the courts. Punishment will deter only
those who expect its imposition. In order to gauge the effectiveness of
criminal sanctions in controlling corporate conduct, one must examine how
67. Id
68. WYo. STAT. § 35-11-901(m) (Supp. 1984).
69. The criminal provisions of the WEQA have never been used in an environmental
prosecution. Typically, the remedies sought by the state have been civil in nature. Fines,
injunctions, and orders of abatement have been used to punish those who violate the Act.
See generally Nickelson v. People, 607 P.2d 904 (Wyo. 1980). The state prosecuted Nickelson
under Wyo. STAT. 35-11-901(a) (1977), which provides for large monetary penalties but fails

to indicate whether the fines are to be considered civil or criminal. When this question was
before the court, it reasoned that the fines were civil because environmental regulations were
outgrowths of property and nuisance law, areas traditionally involving civil remedies. After
Nickelson, one wonders whether the Wyoming Supreme Court would be reluctant to enforce
the criminal provisions of the WEQA.
70. UNIFORM LAW COMMISSIONERS, MODEL SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS ACT § 2 (1979).
Historically, three theories have been advanced to support the imposition of criminal
sanctions: retribution, rehabilitation, and deterrence. Retribution, vengeance, or the idea of

an eye for an eye was at the core of the ancient system of criminal law. Revenge was carried
out by a single individual or small group of individuals attempting to avenge an isolated
wrong that had been done to them or to one of their group members. As rules and laws
developed to keep order, revenge to achieve personal justice fell into disfavor. Individuals
were expected to conduct themselves within the bounds of the law. The system, not the individual, began to prescribe punishment.
The second theory espoused to justify criminal penalties was rehabilitation. This theory
emphasized a criminal's re-entry into society. To the extent that rehabilitation concentrates
on the individual, his background, and his prospects for reform, it is more correctly related
to sentencing and corrections. This theory attacks the problem after the fact, after crimes
have occurred. It does not attempt to prevent crime from being committed, which is the
overall purpose of criminal law. Therefore, the theory has been dismissed as a justification
for criminal penalties by most commentators. Comment, Toward A RationalTheory of Criminal Liability for the CorporateExecutive, 69 J. CRIm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 75, 77 (1978).
71. W. LA FAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 21 (1979).
72. See Comment, supra note 32, at 919.
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existing penalties are used by the courts. As mentioned earlier," 3 environmental statutes contain both civil sanctions as well as criminal
penalties. 4 Which alternative to pursue is left to the discretion of the officer charged with enforcement." Criminal sanctions, however, are used
with alarming infrequency.78 Michael K. Glenn, former Deputy Assistant
Administrator for Federal Water Enforcement, pointed out that: "[Diuring the past twenty-five years the federal government has relied almost
exclusively on negotiation, public pressure, and voluntary compliance by
of achieving compliance with federal
dischargers as the principal means
77
water pollution control laws."
Very few cases exist in which a court imposed the criminal sanction
of either a fine or incarceration on a corporation or one of its agents for
violating an environmental statute. Punishment of individuals involved
in corporate crimes of any type has been extraordinarily uncommon in
the United States. 6 For example, a recent study 9 pointed out just how
unlikely it is for any corporate officer charged under any statute, environmental or otherwise, to be convicted, fined, or incarcerated. The study
found that in 1975 and 1976, only 1.5 percent of all enforcement efforts
produced a conviction of a corporate officer; and of these convictions, only
twenty percent were of high level corporate officials.8 0 Jail sentences, when
imposed, rarely exceeded thirty days, and monetary fines were so low as
to be inconsequential." This "hands off" attitude extended into all areas
where corporations were potential defendants. Corporations that violate
environmental laws continue to enjoy leniency when they face sentencing because of this meekness on the part of the courts in dealing with corporate criminals.
PROSECUTING CORPORATE POLLUTERS: THE UNFORTUNATE REALITY

Criminal prosecutions are infrequent and sentences are light in the
environmental area. For instance, in 1969, only four complaints out of 800,
made under a Boston municipal air pollution law, resulted in prosecution,
and only one resulted in conviction." The situation in the federal courts
73. See supra notes 52-64.
74. Civil sanctions are used most frequently in environmental violations. See supra notes
24-36 and accompanying text.
75. See, e.g., United States v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 391 F.Supp. 1181 (D. Ariz. 1975).
In examining the legislative history of section 309 of the FWPCA, the court determined
that the Act provided alternative sources of enforcement action.
76. United States v. Frezzo Bros., Inc., 602 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1979).
77. Id. at 1124 n.1. Glenn made his comment in 1973 after a comprehensive analysis
of the use of criminal sanctions under the FWPCA.
78. UNITED
STATISTICS - 1982

STATES DEPARTMENT

OF JUSTICE,

SOURCEBOOK

OF CRIMINAL

JUSTICE

526 11983). For instance, in antitrust cases filed in the United States district

courts between 1960 and 1981, the average number of criminal cases filed per year was 24,
with 1970 having a low of 4 and 1981 having a high of 82.
79. M. CLINARD, ILLEGAL CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 206 (1979).
80. Id
81. M. ERMANN & R. LUNDMAN, CORPORATE DEVIANCE 168 (1982).
82. Kovel, A Casefor Civil Penalties,in Comment, The CriminalResponsibility of Corporate Officials for Pollution of the Environment, 37 ALa. L. REV. 61, 66 (1972).
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is just as bad. In United States v. Little Rock Sewer Committee,83 even
though the defendant was found to have knowingly made materially false
statements in reports that were required on a regular basis, the sentence
was suspended. 84 The court refused to impose a fine or other penalty so
long as the defendant brought the sewer system up to statutory standards
within a reasonable time." In another case where probation substantially mitigated the effect of the punishment, an oil company was initially
fined $20,000 and given three years probation,8 6 for failing to report to
the EPA that it had discharged an oil spill into navigable waters. 8' The
fine was to be reduced to $5,000 if no further violations were committed
within the probationary period. 88 In United States v. Blue Lagoon Marina,
Inc., the corporation was acquitted while the individual defendant was
given a fine of $2,500, the minimum allowed by the FWPCA.8 ° The
minimum fine was assessed even though the individual defendantl was
found to have deliberately turned on a gasoline pump and discharged hundreds of gallons of gas onto the surface of a frozen lake.
In only one instance, in United States v. Frezzo Brothers, Inc. 9 was
a maximum fine imposed on a corporation and on the two responsible corporate officials. 92 Although the individuals were given jail sentences, these
sentences were mild.93 The defendants 94 were engaged in a mushroom farming concern. A mixture of hay, water, and horse manure was used by the
corporation as a growing medium for its mushrooms.9 5 On four separate
occasions the defendants were found to have willfully discharged manure
into a nearby creek.96 Composite analysis of the discharges confirmed that
high concentrations of pollutants had been dumped into the waterway.
The corporation was fined $50,000 and the individual defendants were
fined $25,000 each.
It is curious to note, however, that a single large corporation has never
endured a criminal prosecution under a federal environmental statute,
83. 460 F. Supp. 6 (E.D. Ark. 1978).
84. Id at 9.
85. The committee subsequently brought the sewer system up to the standards and
after several conferences the court took the defendant off probation prior to the original expiration date. United States v. Little Rock Sewer Comm., No. LR-CR-77-138 (Oct. 31, 1979).
86. Apex Oil Co. v. United States, 530 F.2d 1291, 1292 (8th Cir. 1976).
87. Id at 1292. If the defendant had reported the spill, then the information could not
have been used against him because section 1321(b)(5) of the FWPCA provides in relevant part that "[n]otification received pursuant to this paragraph or information obtained
by the exploitation of such notification shall not be used against any such person in criminal
case, except a prosecution for perjury or for giving a false statement." 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5)
(1982).
88. Apex Oi4 530 F.2d at 1292.
89. No. 75-80824, (E.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 1975).
90. United States v. Hamel, 551 F.2d 107 (6th Cir. 1977).
91. 602 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1979).
92. Id
93. Id at 1124.
94. The corporation, and the two individuals who served as principal corporate officers,
were defendants. Id.
95. Id at 1125.
96. Id
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although some cases have been settled.97 Large companies are violating
pollution codes but "Ithey are not being forced to undergo criminal prosecutions. This is due to a hesitancy on the part of the prosecutors and the
judiciary to use criminal sanctions.
PREPARING TO PROSECUTE THE CORPORATE POLLUTER

Before an environmental lawsuit is undertaken, a prosecutor should
thoroughly consider the obstacles he will face. He must first determine
who to name as a party; it might be appropriate to charge only the corporation, but perhaps an official should be indicted, or perhaps both should
be named. As a key element of proof it must also be determined how
knowledge of a violation will be shown. If an individual official is charged,
the prosecutor needs to know the extent of the connection between the
violation and that official. Finally, the prosecutor must decide what
penalties he will request and for whom. The following sections will discuss
these issues.
Indictment
Determining who should be indicted in corporate criminal cases is often
difficult. If a corporate official has committed a prohibited act, or in other
words, if he has been the actor himself, it is easy to charge him.99 This
situation is often encountered in small or closely held corporations, 00 where
the decision-maker and employees are the same individuals. The problem
arises when large corporations are involved. In large corporations,
isolating who is "responsible" for a particular violation often involves
unravelling multiple layers of management in corporate hierarchies where
the roles of manager, supervisor, and decision-maker are often indistinguishable. In a large corporation, the person who actually commits a violation is technically guilty of violating the law but often the act is committed by a low level employee who is merely acting under orders from
managers on a higher level. Those who make policy are more "responsible" than those who merely carry out orders. In large organizations, indicting a lower-echelon employee will do little more than provide a
scapegoat for those who actually determine corporate policy.' 01
Indicting a corporate official based on his agency relationship to a
corporation has been held to be a sufficient connection to confer liability
upon the individual. 2 In United States v. Park, 3 the corporate president
97. Conversations with Judd Starr, Attorney, Land and Natural Resources Div., United
States Department of Justice (August 1984).
98. Id.
99. Parisi, Theories of CorporateCriminalLiability in CORPORATIONS AS CRIMINALS 48
(E. Hochstedler ed. 1984). This is the theory known as "identification" in which liability
is direct and not vicarious.
100. United States v. Frezzo Bros., Inc., 602 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1979). The corporation
was a family-run business where the individual defendants were the principal policy-makers
and corporate officers.
101. See Comment, supra note 70.
102. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1974).
103. Id.
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was deemed to wield enough power over the corporation and its employees
to be held liable, even though he personally did not commit the violation.'0 '
Park admitted that he had delegated the task of correcting the unsanitary
conditions that had existed in his warehouses to middle management; Park
admitted though that he ultimately had power over all operations, and
was responsible for them.' °5 Although he did not act, the United States
Supreme Court reasoned it was within his power to see that the conditions were corrected. He did not exercise that power, however. The Court
emphasized that Park was being held criminally liable because of his failure
to act to ensure that the health violations were being corrected.' Park's
ultimate liability was closely tied to his relationship to the company
because this relationship provided him with the power to correct the
infractions.0 7 While a corporate official certainly cannot be expected to
know the day-to-day conduct of every employee in his corporation, after
Park, a corporate manager can be held responsible for violations of which
he has, or should have, knowledge. 0 8
In large organizations the Park case allows a corporate official in a
supervisory position to be held responsible for the acts of those under him.
This liability is not based on any act done by the official but assumes that
the official could have prevented the violation because he had power to
control lower level employees. The relationship of an official to the corporation confers the power to control. Therefore, liability can be conferred
based on one's relationship to the company. This forces those who have
the power to correct the abuses to accept responsibility for their inaction.
It must be emphasized that the basis of liability in Park was the principal's failure to act. This can be likened to nonfeasance; there was a duty
to act to correct the violations, but the duty was ignored. The violative
conduct of lower level management was not imputed to Park although
he had knowledge of the violations. That knowledge could have served
as a justification for imposing liabilty on Park but the Court did not
discuss this even though it is a natural extension of its holding.
Knowledge
Imposing liability on a corporate defendant requires that knowledge
of the offense be shown. 09 Imputing knowledge requires that the corporation, an artificial entity, have knowledge of the actor's violation."' The
Supreme Court disposed of this problem in United States v. A & P Trucking Co.,"' by declaring that "it is elementary that such impersonal entities [such as corporations and partnerships] can be guilty of 'knowing'
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 663-65.
Id. at 664.
Id at 673-74.
Id.
Comment, supra note 70, at 81-84.
See supra note 63.
See, e.g., Ex parte Marley, 29 Cal. 2d 525, 527, 175 P.2d 832, 834 (1946).
358 U.S. 121, 125 (1958).
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or 'willful' violations of regulatory statutes through the doctrine of
respondeat superior."112 After additional discussion, the Court went on
to state:
The business entity cannot be left free to break the law merely
because its owners do not personally participate in the infraction.
The treasury of the business may not with impunity obtain the
fruits of violations which are committed knowingly by agents of
the entity in the scope of their employment. This pressure is
brought on those who own the entity to see to it that their agents
abide by the law. " 3
Therefore, if it is shown that an agent knowingly committed a violation,
courts will impute that knowledge to the corporate principal.
Penalties
Corporate fines are, in effect, licenses to pollute because they are so
light."'4 As one candid executive said, "It's cheaper to pay claims than
it is to control flourides."" 5 Devices needed to eliminate or reduce pollution are often extremely expensive. Until fines begin to be a true burden
for a corporation, it will be less costly for a company to incur fines than
to comply with the law." 6 If fines are nominal, they serve neither the purpose of punishing the corporation for its illegal action, nor of correcting
the infraction for the protection of society.
Punishing a corporation actually punishes those people - shareholders
and the public - with a very tenuous relationship to the act complained
of."' Furthermore, if a fine is imposed it will be internalized as a cost of
doing business; paying the fine through reduced dividends and increased
prices further punishes shareholders and the public. Shareholders' only
recourse would be to vote out the responsible officers through the board
of directors." The effectiveness of this solution is highly questionable." 9
The public, as consumer, must bear the company's punishment, too. The
company, in order to dilute its liability, will distribute its costs and raise
prices. 120 The public will tolerate the violative conduct of management only
while prices remain in an acceptable range. Controlling a corporation's
activities through the imposition of criminal fines will not, in and of itself,
provide an ideal solution to the problem. Fines ought to be retained, for
they are the only form of criminal punishment which can be imposed on
a corporate entity.
112. Id. at 125.
113. Id. at 126.
114. F. GRAD, supra note 15, at 2-555.
115. Reynolds Metals Co. v. Lampert, 324 F.2d 465, 466 (9th Cir. 1963).
116. Comment, supra note 70.
117. "By penalizing the corporation it is often the case that innocent investors are the
real suffers, while the guilty parties are free to again violate the law.... Whiting, Antitrust
and the CorporateExecutive, 47 U. VA. L. REv. 929, 945 n.63 (1961).
118. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 51 (1974).
119. Eisenberg, Legal Models of Management Structure in the Modern Corporation,63
CAL. L. REV. 375, 400-01 (1975).
120. See Comment, supra note 18, at 62.
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Another problem with imposing a criminal fine on a corporate entity
is that it allows those who are personally responsible for the violation to
remain unscathed. Not only does indicting a corporation without naming
responsible individuals as defendants allow them to go unpunished, it also
highlights two additional difficulties. First, for many purposes corporations are treated as natural persons.' This legal fiction ignores the fact
1 22
that corporations cannot act except through agents and various officials.
Often because of the depersonalized nature of a corporation, juries tend
to separate the prohibited conduct from the individual actor.1 23 Even
though a certain individual must be responsible for a violation, juries
typically allow the individual to go unpunished. In most instances, the
actor is not acting for personal gain, but at the behest of the corporation. 2 "
Punishing only a corporation as opposed to an individual is not always
preferable because the true violator is not punished, and those bearing
the brunt of the penalty are not the guilty parties. Punishing only responsible parties is also not a perfect solution because the corporation benefits
from actions not paid for. The best course of action is to punish both, and
to punish them effectively.
In addition to criminal fines the possibility of incarceration also exists. Although jailing a corporation, an artificial entity, is not possible,
jailing those who make the violative policies accomplishes the objective
of sanctioning the guilty party. A denial of liberty is an unpleasant prospect for the corporate executive and should be used without hesitation
by the courts to encourage corporate officials to comply with the law.
CONCLUSION

Criminal sanctions are rarely used against corporations that pollute.
The sanctions exist but they are simply not utilized. Congress included
criminal provisions in environmental legislation to strengthen the government's enforcement capabilities, but the court system is frustrating this
enforcement effort. Stiff monetary fines and incarceration exist to deter
the polluter, but courts either refuse to impose these penalties, or they
impose such diluted versions that the sanctions do not amount to punishment.
To rectify the ineffective sentencing that is now occurring, criminal
sanctions should be imposed more stringently on both corporations and
121. Id.
122. Id. at 65.
123. See Comment, supra note 32, at 910.
124. United States v. Hamel, 551 F.2d 107 (6th Cir. 1977). In United States v. Hamel,
however, the tendency to exonerate the individual was ignored. Both the corporation, Blue
Lagoon Marina, Inc., and its yard foreman, Gilbert G. Hamel, were charged with violating
the criminal portion of the FWPCA. The jury found Hamel guilty after hearing eyewitness
testimony that he activated a pump that dispensed over 300 gallons of gasoline onto
Michigan's Lake St. Clair. The judge acquitted the corporation. Perhaps the eyewitness testimony relieved the corporation of liability, although generally the knowledge of the corporation's employees is imputed to the corporation. Normally, the violation is clearly one which
benefits the corporation. The Hamel case is rather atypical, for it is difficult to see how Hamel's
actions benefitted himself or the corporation in anyway.
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responsible individuals. When imposing criminal fines on corporate bodies,
fines should be given in amounts which reflect their punitive character.
Congress should adopt a scheme similar to the one found in the FWPCA,
where a minimum fine is set. It does little good to impose a $500 fine on
a company that earns several billion dollars a year. Issuing licenses to
pollute are not the function of our courts. In all cases an effort should
be made to identify responsible individuals within the organization.
Sentencing violators to one year in jail will surely provide the impetus
for corporate leaders to correct existing violations. The tactics suggested,
although harsh, are the only effective ways that corporations can be
prevented from disregarding the health of our environment.
MICHELE KURUC
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